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Anti-privacy legislation

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Contents9
  1. How it works
  2. Why it is a problem
  3. Anti-privacy legislation is a direct infringement of the First and Fourth Amendments found in the Bill of Rights (U.S.A.)
  4. List of Legislation
  5. What you can do
  6. Tools & Resources
  7. Further Reading
  8. References
  9. External Links

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Anti-privacy legislation simply put is a legislation that may be created with malicious intent or not that invoke ones right to privacy. More recently, governments across the world have introduced various pieces of such legislation, which has caused damage to the privacy consumers have with their technology.

How it works

The legislative process might vary from country or region, but the US legislative process is as follows:[1]

  1. A representative needs to sponsor a bill
  2. The bill is then assigned to a committee for study
  3. If the bill is released by said committee, the bill is put on a calendar to be voted on.
  4. If the majority of people vote for the bill(51 or more out of 100), then the bill is passed
  5. A conference committee made of House & Senate members then works out any differences between the House & Senate version of the bill
  6. Finally, the resulting bill heads back to the House & Senate for final approval by the President, If the bill is signed, then it has officially become law.[1]

Now that such anti-privacy legislation has been approved, it can be enforced by federal agencies via penalties.

Anti-privacy legislation enforce companies, products or services to collect user's sensitive data in order to comply with purposes that are usually tagged as "safety".

Why it is a problem

Anti-privacy legislation is frequently incompatible with already established legislation or constitutions from countries or regions, that have even been enforced no matter if these legislation are violating the country/region's constitution or legislation protecting online privacy, anonymity or freedom of speech.

Anti-privacy legislation is a direct infringement of the First and Fourth Amendments found in the Bill of Rights (U.S.A.)

  • The First amendment states:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.[2]

If Anti-privacy legislation were to be implemented, that gives anyone with access to data on someone the ability to restrict freedom of speech or oppose those with unwanted views of the world, thus infringing the 1st amendment.[citation needed (28 Feb 2026)]

  • The Fourth amendment reads as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[3]

Anti-privacy legislation infringes on a citizen's right to avoid "unreasonable searches and seizures" since it may require/force citizens to show proof of age (selfies, IDs, credit cards) without real probable cause. It may also force said citizen to use less secure services that allow federal agencies to gain higher access to said services and retrieve whatever data is "needed".[citation needed (28 Feb 2026)]

  • Anti-privacy legislation can also build the framework and foundation for other and more extreme anti-privacy measures, and such anti-privacy measures can lead to the slow development of a surveillance state.[4]

List of Legislation

Bill/Law name Country/State Basic summary of Legislation Method of Eroding Privacy Status
The KIDS Act U.S [TBA] Identity disclosure/Censorship/Anti-Encryption Passed House
UK Online Safety Act United Kingdom The UK Online Safety Act is a set of law's that pushes for Age verification in order to protect quote; "children and adults online". Said enforcement includes disapproving "Illegal Content", & forcing website and domain owners to utilize "highly effective age assurance" to prevent children from accessing potentially harmful content. This act also requires such platforms to " provide parents and children with clear and accessible ways to report problems online when they do arise." Age Verification Approved (Signed on Oct 26, 2023, Active since Jul 25 2025)
USA PATRIOT ACT U.S Placeholder: This law strengthened a policing type agency's ability to surveil & investigate things related to devices, along with other things.(Found under Title II) Enhanced Technological & Real Life Surveillance Approved (Signed on Oct 26, 2001)
Florida HB 253 Florida, U.S Florida's 253 House Bill disallows ones ability to, in their own words, utilize "license plate obscuring devices" to prevent criminals from "escaping from or avoiding detection or arrest in connection with such crime", which could be interpreted as being punished for avoiding ALPR detection. ALPR Jamming Circumvention Approved (Signed on May 19th 2025, Active since Oct 1 2025)
Texas Senate Bill 2420 (2025) Texas, U.S Texas Senate Bill 2420(also known as the "App Store Accountability Act") requires app store owners & maintainers to utilize "Commercially reasonable method('s)" In order to verify the ages their users. If someone is In a category that isn't explicitly labeled "adult", then the user is considered a minor and must ask a parent or legal guardian for permission in order to install new applications that may be considered inappropriate for their age group. Age Verification Rejected
California Assembly Bill No. 1043 California, U.S The California Assembly Bill No. "1043" requires operating system owners, publishers/providers, & developers & maintainers to implement system level age verification via an "accessible interface at account setup", which then is used as an "age signal" for "applications available in a covered application store". Any person that violates this proposed bill(now law) will face a fine of 2,500$ per unintentional violation or 7,500$ per intentional violation. Age Indication Approved (Active Jan 1, 2027)
Colorado Senate Bill SB26-051 Colorado, U.S The Colorado Senate Bill "SB26-051" is a "copycat bill" of California's own "Assembly Bill No. 1043" which requires operating systems of any kind(open source or not), to utilize an interface on account setup to gain an age signal for developers to use in the main app store. Overview of said bill reads as follows; "The bill requires application developers to receive user age information and use it to comply with any applicable law." Device-Based Age Indication Approved (Active Jan 1, 2028)
S.737 - Screen Act U.S Senate bill S. 737(also known as the Screen Act) is a bill that pushes for Age verification. The Technology Verification measures listed in section 4 state that a covered platform should adopt and utilize age verification measures, and that such measures must ensure that 1; users of the covered platform are not minors and 2; minors are prevented from accessing any content on the covered platform that is harmful to minors. Age Verification Introduced
S.1207 - Earn It Act U.S The Earn It Act quote "revises the federal framework governing the prevention of online sexual exploitation of children" by limiting the "liability protections of interactive computer service providers(Encryption)", essentially making the Earn it Act an "anti-encryption" bill. (Which is, for the most part, necessary to protect ones own important documents & maintain a level of privacy in the digital age) Anti-Encryption Introduced
S.1748 - Kids Online Safety Act U.S The Kids Online Safety Act is one that quote "requires covered online platforms, including social media platforms, to implement tools and safeguards to protect users and visitors under the age of 17. Covered platforms are online platforms, video games, messaging applications, or video streaming services used or likely to be used by individuals under the age of 17, with specified exceptions." Censorship/Age-Gating Introduced
S.146 - TAKE IT DOWN Act U.S The Take It Down Act (stands for Tools to Address Known Exploitation by Immobilizing Technological Deepfakes on Websites and Networks Act) is a law that prohibits the publication of "non-consensual" intimate visual depictions of individuals, both real or computer-generated, and requires certain online platforms to promptly remove such depictions upon receiving notice of their existence.", and such covered platforms are; public websites, online services, or applications that allows for user generated content on forums. Such a law could be and shouldn't be used as an excuse for censorship or otherwise prevention of free speech.[5] Anti-Encryption/Censorship Approved
Real-life identity disclosure required to activate SIM cards.[6][7] Many countries. People are required to associate their real-life identity with their SIM cards, making "burner phones" impossible, and making it impossible to access the cellular Internet without being tracked by the government. Additionally, this can be used to exclude political dissidents from accessing the Internet. Identity disclosure Approved in many countries over time.
Utah S.B. 73 Utah, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Passed House committee
Ohio HB 84 Ohio, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Wisconsin SB 130 Wisconsin, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Passed Senate
Missouri HB 3015/1839 Missouri, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Passed first committee
Iowa HF 2606 Iowa, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Passed first committee
Missouri HB 1839 & 901/1346/1412 Missouri, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Passed first committee
Wyoming HB 72 Wyoming, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
West Virginia HB 4412 West Virginia, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Passed the House
Rhode Island HB 7746 Rhode Island, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Illinois SB 3946 Illinois, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Maryland HB 908 Maryland, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Tennessee HB 2522/SB 2398 Tennessee, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Maryland HB 693 Mayland, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Iowa SF 2159 Iowa, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
West Virginia SB 628 West Virginia, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Iowa HF 864 Iowa, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Passed first chamber
West Virginia SB 498 West virginia, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
New Jersey S 1826 New Jersey, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Missouri HB 1878 Missouri, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
New Hampshire SB 648 New Hampshire, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
New York S3591 / A3946 New York, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Washington HB 2112 Washington, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Parents Over Platforms Act - HR 6333 U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Hawaii HB 1198 Hawaii, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Hawaii HB 1212 Hawaii, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Iowa SF 207/443 Iowa [TBA] Age Verification Passed first committee
Massachusetts H 1626 Massachusetts, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Pennsylvania HB 1513 Pennsylvania, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Michigan SB284/HB 4429 Michigan, U.S [TBA] Device-Based Age Verification Introduced
Pennsylvania SB 603 Pennsylvania, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Tennessee HB 222 / SB 466 Tennessee, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Michigan SB 191 Michigan, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Minnesota HF 1875 Minnesota [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Minnesota SF 2105/HF 1434 Minnesota, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Alabama HB 164 Alabama, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Approved (Active since Oct 1 2024)
Alabama HB 393 Alabama, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Alabama HB 441 Alabama, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Alaska HB 254 Alaska, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Arizona HB 2112 Arizona, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Approved (Signed on May 13th 2025)
Arizona HB 2586 Arizona, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Arizona HB 2656 Arizona, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Arizona SB 1125 Arizona, U.S [TBA] (Identical to SB 1298, Arizona) Age Verification Rejected
Arizona SB 1298 Arizona, U.S [TBA] (Identical to SB 1125, Arizona) Age Verification Rejected
Arizona SB 1341 Arizona, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Arizona SB 1503 Arizona, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Arkansas SB 66 Arkansas, U.S [TBA] (Copycat of Louisiana's AVS law) Age Verification Approved (Active since July 31 2023)
California AB 127 California, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Approved
California AB 1501 California, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
California AB 2273 (2022) California, U.S [TBA] Age Verification/Censorship Approved
California AB 3080 California, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
CASE–IT Act (2023) U.S [TBA] Age Verification/Censorship Rejected
Colorado SB 25-201 Colorado, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Delaware HB 265 Delaware, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Florida HB 3 Florida, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Approved (Active since Jan 1 2025)
Florida HB 931/SB 1438 Florida, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Florida SB 1620 Florida, U.S [TBA] Age Verification/Censorship Rejected
Florida SB 472 Florida, U.S [TBA] (Copycat of Louisiana's AVS law) Age Verification Rejected
Louisiana HB Bill/Act No. 440 Louisiana, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Approve (Active since
Georgia HB 910 Georgia, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Failed (Incorporated in SB 351)
Georgia SB 351 Georgia, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Approved (Active since Jul 1 2025)
Hawaii HB 1198 Hawaii, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Hawaii HB 1212 Hawaii, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Introduced
Idaho H 448 Idaho, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Rejected
Idaho H 498 Idaho, U.S [TBA] Age Verification Approved (Active since Jul 1 2024)
Congress H.R.8250 U.S [TBA] Device-Based Age Verification Introduced
Safe Digital Environments Law (Ley de Entornos Digitales Seguros) Chile This project looks to follow practices as the ones that have been taking effect in Europe and Australia, to ban users under 16 from social media. It mandates to add age verification methods using Chilean digital ID (Clave Única) for social media sites to prevent underage users to access them Age Verification/Censorship Proposed
Bill 16431-15 Chile Modifies Law N° 18,168 to mandate network providers to add age verification methods to prevent minors to access to explicit sexual content Age Verification/Censorship Introduced on November 21st, 2023
(EU) 2019/1157

(EU) 2025/1208

EU The regulation seeks to strengthen security by collecting facial photographs and fingerprints of citizens and storing them in identity cards in electronic form.[8]

The European Court of Justice later ruled this form of data collection to be constitutional in 2024, but required the regulation to be replaced due to a faulty legal basis.[9]

Such a replacement regulation was introduced in 2025.[10]

Biometric Data Collection Introduced
Chat Control 1.0 EU Messenger and Social Media platforms must scan private messages for potential abuse material.

The law was ntroduced as temporary emergency regulation in 2021, then Rejected by a parliament majority in March 2026. It was re-introduced 2026 due to a ruse by the conservative party EVP. The emergency regulation ran out and Parliament President Roberta Metsola (EVP) put it back on the agenda shortly before the summer break when traditionally many members of parliament are no longer in town. This is critical since a rejection would have required an absolute majority of 360 votes against. The majority of the MPs present voted against the extension (286 against, 276 in favor, 17 abstained), but with this the extension still passed.[11][12][13]

Surveillance of private messages Rejected by parliament in 2026, but re-Introduced as Emergency Regulation until 2028
Chat Control 2.0 EU Messengers have to have a built-in backdoor to allow scanning of messages. If suspicious content is found (likely by means of a proprietary software), the content is sent to an institution which is not under court oversight.[14][15] Introduced based on lobbying by a U.S. non-profit called Thorn, a vendor of such scanning software. [16][17] Anti-Encryption, Surveillance Rejected by EU parlament on multiple occasions, but keeps getting re-introduced
Age Verification EU EU Commissioner von der Leyen is pushing heavily for age verification. A report by the committee for online safety for youth and children recommends measures that far exceed even those of the Australian model.

Criticism of the report includes that that it was only written by two members of the committee who agreed with the commissioner's desired results because no concensus could be reached, heavily influenced by von der Leyen in the writing phase (who "supported them in terms of content"), not scientific despite claiming otherwise, and adopting characteristic terminology used by Thorn, the U.S-based child protection lobbying group which is also behind Chat Control.[18]

In response, a citizen initiative called "Stop Killing the Internet" (a reference to the "Stop Killing Games" movement) has been registered. It opposes mandatory eIDs and age verification. Citizens and organizations can sign up on the project website.[19][20]

Age verification Pursued by EU Commission
Novelle des Audiovisuelle Mediendienste-Gesetzes

(Amendment to the "Audiovisual Media Services Act")

Austria According to the proposal, people under 14 are barred from using social networks, video platforms and websites that include any of these features: autoplaying of content, endless scrolling, a recommendation system where more than a third of content is not from accounts the user has subscribed to, direct contact of users with others they are not subscribed to, push notifications about people or things the user is not subscribed to, incentives to increase interaction.

Age verification is to be performed by an independent third party. The government suggests usage of the Austiran electronic ID. [21]

Age Verification Proposed
Age Verification France France has introduced a social media ban for people under 15 years of age, to be enforced by means of age verification starting September 1st, 2026.

The technical details are not specified, the French digital minister just stated that "age verification tools already exist", sparking concerns the solutions would follow the UK model, and just claimed that "users' personal data would be protected" without going into detail.[22]

Age verification Introduced
Anti-Terror-Paket (Anti terrorism package) Germany Telcos are required to verify identity of the buyer when selling and activating SIM cards. Reason given is fight against terrorism. Introduced by a coalition of christian conservative parties (CDU/CSU) and social democrats (SPD).[23][24] ID verification Introduced effective July 1st 2017
Vorratsdatenspeicherung (Communication Data Retention) Germany Communication data (phone and fax logs, SMS, IP addresses, e-mail communication metadata) of all citizens have to be stored by the telecommunications provider without cause and made available to law enforcement.

First introduced in 2007 with votes only from CDU and SPD (conservatives and center left), accompanied by a statement that they expect the to likely be ruled unconstitutional but that it is still necessary to fight terrorism. A series of lawsuits, discussions and revisions followed, the full details of which can be found on the corresponding German Wikipedia Article.

In 2022, the European Court of Justice ruled this type of data retention without proper cause to be in violation of basic rights and this ruling was confirmed by several German courts.[25]

Despite these court rulings, in April 2026, the German Government (CDU + SPD) again proposed a bill to store all IP addresses without cause for 3 months.[26]

Phone and Internet Surveillance Introduced 2007, ruled unconstitutional in 2022, proposed again April 2026
Federal Police Act Reform Germany Legalizes real-time AI face recognition and biometric identification from live data feeds (last minute addition to the bill), legalizes installation of state trojans on citicens' devices for surveillance purposes.

Proposed by government (CDU + SPD); In the interior committee, it was approved with votes from CDU + SPD; Greens and Left opposed, AfD (radical right) abstained.[27]

Some commenters suspect that the debate in parliament is intentionally scheduled to occur during a major football event (world cup).[28]

AI Video Surveillance, Police Trojans Proposed by Government and approved by Interior Committee July 2026,, to be debated in parliament soon
Gesetz zur Reform des Nachrichtendienstrechts ("Act to Reform Intelligence Service Law") Germany Significantly expands the powers of German intelligence agencies.

Suggested by Minister of Interior Alexander Dobrindt of Christian conservative party CSU. The proposed changes includes the permission to hack systems, to use, train and buy AI, including foreign solutions like those from Peter Thiel's Palantir. Public and private cameras (presumably including cars, vacuum robots, laptop, TV, phone cameras and more) may be hacked and their feeds analyzed in real-time, including AI face and biometric recognition. It also allows for large-scale internet surveillance and reduces transparency and control.

Moreover, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) would have to disclose zero-day vulnerabilites to intelligence agencies. The division of intelligence gathering and the power of taking action, which the bill seeks to abolish, was introduced in Germany after the end of WW2 based on the bad experiences with secret state police (Gestapo) under the Nazi regime. Critics again stipulate that the timing at the beginning of the Berlin summer holidays and during a football world cup is deliberate.[29]

AI Video Surveillance (private cameras included), Hacking, Internet Mass Surveillance, Hoarding of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, Reduction of Transparency Drafted and presented
Reformpaket (July 2026) [Reform Package] Germany Pushed for by the CDU/CSU (conservatives) and SPD (center-left) government.

The act exempts small and medium sized enterprises as well as non-profits and non-commercial entities from privacy legislations such as GDPR. 99.3% of German enterprises qualify, so this would effectively repeal existing privacy legislation. This would also affect companies and non-profits dealing with highly sensitive personal information, such as medical labs and domestic abuse aid organizations.[30]

Moreover, it effectively abolishes the right to information freedom (Informationsfreiheitsgesetz, IFG) which compels state institutions to answer requests for information from citizens. This law has previously lead to corruption scandals involving CDU politicians coming to light on multiple occasions.[31]

An internal memory from the Ministry of Interior suggests that rights of journalists, scientists and even members of parliament to request information are being targeted. Information on ongoing legislative prodedures would become completely confidential, making it close to impossible to expose lobbying scandals before a law is passed.[32]

The attack on the IFG has sparked a public outcry. A petition to urge SPD to turn its stance and vote against the proposal of the coalition partner gathered more than 600 000 signatures to date.[33]

Data Privacy,

Government Accountability

Proposed
Polizeigesetz ("Police Law") Berlin, Germany Berlin is both a city and a federal state of Germany.

The Berlin federal state government, consisting of a coalition of center-right (CDU) and center-left (SPD), introduced a reform to the state police law, legalizing AI video surveillance by the police, as well as authorizing the use of police trojans to circumvent both end-to-end and transport encryption.[34](Translation)

The company in charge of creating the technical infrastructure, Adesso SE, received four million Euros for the project and is known to have suffered a major security incident in the past where attackers had large-scale access to internal systems from mid-2022 until January 2023.[35][36]

The system generates alerts for behaviour deemed suspicious, including "loitering without reason".[37]

AI Video Surveillance,

Police Trojans

Passed in 2025
Polizeigesetz ("Police Law") Schleswig-Holstein, Germany The new draft law allows police to use Palantir-like AI data analysis, introduce AI video surveillance with facial recognition, behavior recognition, tracking peohple across cameras, automated filming into cars, including non-driving passengers, to do AI detection of phone use while driving, license plate scanning. It legalizes using armed drones (webs etc.) to fight adversarial drones.

The law is proposed by a coalition of CDU (conservatives) and the Green Party.[38]

AI Video Surveillance, AI analysis of personal data, License Plate Readers proposed
U.S. Health Agreement 22 African States One of the first measures during Donald Trump's second presidency was to cut the USAID payments.

Now the U.S. governments is offering several African countries to resume payments in exchange for complete access to private personal health records of their citizens.

Already signed:

Nigeria, Kenia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Kongo

Declined:

Ghana, Sambia, Zimbabwe[39][40]

Health Records Gathering,

Digital Colonialism

varies by country, several have already signed

What you can do

In order to oppose/dispute Anti-privacy legislation created by legislators, you can:

  1. Spread the word; not everyone knows about these bills or the mere existence of these types of bills and therefore wont even fight back[citation needed (1 Mar 2026)]
  2. Contact local legislators & representatives; If enough people oppose a proposed bill, local legislators may delay the bill or back off on their decision entirely. If enough citizens instead urge a representative to vote against a bill, said representatives could potentially follow up on the citizen's behalf.[citation needed (1 Mar 2026)]
  3. Sign Petitions; Signing petitions is another way to the message across to both legislators & other people alike.[citation needed (1 Mar 2026)]
  4. Support Pro Consumer/Privacy Bills; Supporting bills/would-be laws that protect consumer privacy & ownership helps to circumvent future bills that aim for the opposite affect.[citation needed (1 Mar 2026)]

Tools & Resources

  • Age Verification Bills is a sub-site of the the domain Action Free Speech Coalition that specifically lists all bills pushing for any form of "Age verification".
  • Bad Internet Bills is a website listing quote "bad internet bills" in a easily accessible manner.
  • US State Privacy Legislation Tracker is a sub site of the domain Iapp that tracks many but not all pro-privacy or consumer U.S bills that have passed or not. This includes bills that support consumer rights & bills that businesses are obligated to comply with. (Click here to view the chart & here to view the map in the U.S)

Further Reading

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 "The Legislative Process". United States House of Representatives. 23 Feb 2026. Archived from the original on 19 Jan 2026. Retrieved 23 Feb 2026.
  2. ↑ "U.S Constitution - First Amendment". Constitution Annotated. 28 Feb 2026. Archived from the original on 2026-03-07. Retrieved 28 Feb 2026.
  3. ↑ "U.S Constitution - Fourth Amendment". Constitution Annotated. 28 Feb 2026. Archived from the original on 2026-02-24. Retrieved 28 Feb 2026.
  4. ↑ Sherwinter, Daniel (28 Feb 2026). "Surveillance's Slippery Slope; Using Encryption to Recapture Privacy Rights" (PDF). Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2024-07-30. Retrieved 28 Feb 2026.
  5. ↑ Kelley, Jason (28 Apr 2026). "Congress Passes TAKE IT DOWN Act Despite Major Flaws". Electronic Frontier Foundation. Archived from the original on 1 May 2026. Retrieved 22 May 2026.
  6. ↑ "SIM Card Registration". Privacy International. 6 Mar 2026. Archived from the original on 2025-12-08. Retrieved 6 Mar 2026.
  7. ↑ Bischoff, Paul (2025-04-23). "Which governments impose SIM-card registration laws to collect data on their citizens?". Comparitech. Archived from the original on 2026-01-17. Retrieved 6 Mar 2026.
  8. ↑ "Regulation - 2019/1157 - EN". EUR-Lex. 2019-07-12. Retrieved 2026-07-22.
  9. ↑ "EU top court upholds ruling on fingerprints for ID cards". DW - Deutsche Welle. 2024-03-21. Retrieved 2026-07-22.
  10. ↑ "Regulation - EU - 2025/1208 - EN". EUR-Lex. 2025-06-20. Retrieved 2026-07-22.
  11. ↑ Ojamo, Janne (2026-07-09). "Combating child sexual abuse online: support for more limited ePrivacy derogation". European Parliament. Retrieved 2026-07-10.
  12. ↑ Faust, Mike (2026-07-09). "Abstimmung im EU-Parlament – Die anlasslose Chatkontrolle ist wieder da [Vote in EU parliament – chat control without due cause is back]". Golem. Retrieved 2026-07-10.
  13. ↑ Krempl, Stefan (2026-07-09). "Procedural trick before summer break: EU Parliament reactivates Chat Control 1.0". Heise Online. Retrieved 2026-07-10.
  14. ↑ "Fight Chat Control". Fight Chat Control. Retrieved 2026-06-02.
  15. ↑ "Stop Chat Control".
  16. ↑ Krempl, Stefan (2023-08-27). "Lobbygeflecht bei Chatkontrolle: "Schlimmste Befürchtungen bestätigt" (Lobby Entanglements around Chat Control: "Worst Suspicions Confirmed")". Heise Online. Retrieved 2026-07-03.
  17. ↑ Breyer, Patrick (2025-02-25). "Chat control: EU Ombudsman criticises revolving door between Europol and chat control tech lobbyist Thorn". Patrick Breyer - Digitaler Freiheitskämpfer. Retrieved 2026-07-03.
  18. ↑ Meineck, Sebastian (2026-07-17). "Bericht mit Mängeln: Wissenschaftlicher Anstrich für Alterskontrollen [Flawed report: A veneer of scientific credibility for age checks]". Netzpolitik.org. Retrieved 2026-07-19.
  19. ↑ "Stop Killing the Internet". Stop Killing the Internet. 2026. Retrieved 2026-07-25.
  20. ↑ Krempl, Stefan (2026-07-23). "Citizens' initiative "Stop Killing The Internet" opposes age controls". Heise Online. Retrieved 2026-07-25.
  21. ↑ Sokolov, Daniel AJ (2026-07-28). "Mandatory ID for access to social networks and video platforms in Austria". Heise Online. Retrieved 2026-07-28.
  22. ↑ AFP (2026-07-21). "France becomes first EU country to ban social media access for under-15s". The Guardian. Retrieved 2026-07-22.
  23. ↑ Milosevic, Josefine (2017-06-30). "Prepaid-Karten: Ausweispflicht ab dem 1. Juli". Connect. Retrieved 2026-07-02.
  24. ↑ Briegleb, Volker (2016-06-01). "Ausweispflicht bei Prepaid-SIMs: Kabinett bringt Anti-Terror-Paket auf den Weg". Heise Online. Retrieved 2026-07-02.
  25. ↑ "Vorratsdatenspeicherung in Deutschland [Communications Data Retention in Germany]". Wikipedia. Retrieved 2026-07-20.
  26. ↑ Kohler, Sarah-Daniela (2026-04-22). "Bundeskabinett beschließt umstrittene IP-Adressenspeicherung [Federal Cabinet approves controversial IP address retention]". Die Zeit. Retrieved 2026-07-20.
  27. ↑ Krempl, Stefan (2026-07-08). "Federal Police: Coalition OKs AI real-time tracking & state trojans". Heise Online. Retrieved 2026-07-09.
  28. ↑ cooregan (2026-07-08). "Übersetzung: schwarz-rot schleift während der Fussball- WM das Grundrecht ... mit einer weiteren Form von Massenüberwachung. [In other words: Red-Black erodes fundamental human rights with another form of mass surveillance during the football world cup]". Forum - Heise Online. Retrieved 2026-07-09.
  29. ↑ Joswig, Gareth (2026-07-15). "Dobrindts Schnüffeloffensive [Dobrindt's Snooping Push]". TAZ. Retrieved 2026-07-18.
  30. ↑ Dachwitz, Ingo (2026-07-15). "Reformpaket: Schwarz-Rot will 99 Prozent der deutschen Unternehmen vom Datenschutz ausnehmen [Reform Package: Black-Red coalition wants to excempt 99 percent of German enterprises from privacy legislation]". Netzpolitik.org. Retrieved 2026-07-21.
  31. ↑ Reuter, Markus (2026-07-03). "Staatliche Transparenz: Angriff auf Informationsfreiheit sorgt weiter für heftige Kritik [Government transparency: Attack on freedom of information continues to spark fierce criticism]". Netzpolitik.org. Retrieved 2026-07-21.
  32. ↑ Krempl, Stefan (2026-07-23). "Dobrindt: ID requirement to halt freedom of information". Heise Online. Retrieved 2026-07-24.
  33. ↑ "SPD, stoppt den Frontalangriff auf die Informationsfreiheit! [SPD, stop the frontal attack on freedom of information!]". WeAct. 2026-07-02. Retrieved 2026-07-21.
  34. ↑ Reuter, Schwarzenbeck, Markus, Martin (2025-09-25). "Neues Polizeigesetz in Berlin: „Abkehr von der grundrechtsfreundlichen Politik" [New police law in Berlin: A departure from policy that favors fundamental rights]". Netzpolitik.org. Retrieved 2026-07-18.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  35. ↑ Schwarzbeck, Martin (2026-07-14). "Videoüberwachung in Berlin: Adesso SE baut Verhaltensscanner für die Polizei". Netzpolitik.org. Retrieved 2026-07-18.
  36. ↑ "Aktuelle Informationen zum Cyber-Angriff auf adesso". Adesso SE. 2023-04-26. Archived from the original on 2026-07-14. Retrieved 2026-07-18.
  37. ↑ Krempl, Stefan (10 Mar 2026). "Surveillance in Berlin: When AI reports "loitering without reason"". heise.
  38. ↑ Schwarzbeck, Martin (2026-07-24). "Polizeigesetz-Erweiterung in Schleswig-Holstein: Schwarz-Grün will dich beim Autofahren filmen [Police law extension in Schleswig-Holstein: Black-Green coalition wants to film you while driving]". Netzpolitik.org. Retrieved 2026-07-28.
  39. ↑ Lerner + Barry-Jester, Sharon + Anna Maria (2026-06-17). ""Digital Colonialism": U.S. Demands to Access Africans' Data Raise Privacy, Sovereignty Concerns". Propublica. Retrieved 2026-07-28.
  40. ↑ Dachwitz, Ingo (2026-07-25). "Digitaler Kolonialismus: Wie die US-Regierung afrikanischen Ländern Daten-Deals aufzwingt [Digital Colonialsim: How the U.S. government is forcing African countries into data deals]". Netzpolitik.org. Retrieved 2026-07-28.
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